The Demise of Osama bin Laden – Some Observations from an Indian Perspective

On the face of it, it would appear that the death of Osama bin Laden at the hands of US forces is a very important milestone in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, perhaps signaling a reversal in the deteriorating American fortunes in the region. The reasons are not hard to understand. For one, it serves to boost the flagging morale of a population and military frustrated by their inability to conclusively win the war. Also, the way the operation was planned and conducted was an unambiguous show of decisiveness and strength by the United States. For a country that over the last few years seemed to have been put on the back foot in Af-Pak, hampered by directionless leadership and clumsily stumbling from one strategic setback to another (the latest being the Raymond Davis episode), the news could not have come at a better time. And lastly, it provides at least a semblance of justice to the families of the people who died in the 9/11 attacks. However, the long-term strategic implications of this event are almost zero, and may even exacerbate the security situation in Afghanistan. It is worth remembering that in the last five years, bin Laden had been reduced to a nobody, his presence inconsequential to the events unfolding in the region. While bagging him now does present the United States with a small victory, it is of little solace when the country has already lost the real prize – a stable and pliable Af-Pak with the United States shaping policy and events to further its long-term security interests. The tide of the war now seems to have shifted decisively in favour of Pakistan’s military-jehadi complex, and this event provides the Obama administration with just the excuse it needed to make a face-saving exit from the theatre. At the same time, Pakistan, and by extension, China, are perfectly positioned to fill the power vacuum this would create – putting them to control of the most important real estate in the continent and the gateway to Central Asian energy and mineral deposits.

In the short term, this event is sure to have repercussions for India, none of them positive. The brazenness with which the US military penetrated Pakistan’s well-defended air-space, that too by launching a successful intrusion near the heart of Pakistan’s military establishment, is sure to massively demoralize the junior and middle ranks of the Pakistani military. Additionally, having cast themselves as the sole defenders of the Islamic Republic from the designs of the crafty Americans and Indians, this very public failure of the Pakistani military is bound to affect the Pakistani population’s confidence in it. Indeed, just a few months back, it would have been unheard of for a junior officer to caustically utter “I am ashamed of what happened in Abbottabad” before the all-powerful Army chief, with the latter struggling to come up with a reply better than “So am I”, leave alone the ISI chief having to undergo a humiliating excoriation at the hands of the country’s parliament. At a time of such weakness, it would make perfect sense for the military leadership to make a play to regain its prestige and power, by seeking a definitive and public victory against a universally accepted enemy. And unsurprisingly, India stands out as a unique and enticingly soft target, the hatred for which runs deep in the Pakistani psyche – perhaps to the extent that it transcends the internal fissures in Pakistani society. One therefore hopes that the Indian leadership is taking measures to prevent a devastating terrorist strike in India, and is making preparations to deal with one when it occurs.

Speaking of terrorism, there is no reason for Indians to go overboard in rejoicing at the death of bin Laden. Indeed, he was a terrorist, but at no time was he an enemy of India except in the broadest ideological sense, and never really a particularly dangerous one. His support for the jihadi terrorism in Kashmir amounted to little more than lip service, and Al Qaida hasn’t been known to operate in Kashmir in any substantial capacity. At this time, it would do Indians well to remember that figures like Masood Azhar (a convicted terrorist, unlike bin Laden), Hafiz Sayeed, and hundreds of others walk free in Pakistan, spew hatred at India at every opportunity, and are not exactly averse to backing it up with action. The threat that Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed represent to India and Indian citizens is multiple orders of magnitude greater than what Al Qaida ever did. When these gentlemen are dispatched to meet their maker, we would have a real reason to celebrate. In the meanwhile, we are only doing a disservice to our country by acting oblivious to the fact that these people are safe under the protection of an enemy state, while celebrating the death of someone who was little more than an icon of Islamic terrorism for the West.

On a related note, it is worth noting we are, and not for the first time, seeing certain quarters (including some in Pakistan) refer to the ISI’s so-called perfidy in hiding Osama and sheltering terrorism. I think it is high time we stopped swallowing as truth the tosh about a “rogue ISI” or “rogue elements within the ISI” as independent entities. It casts the Pakistani state as an innocent body and allows it to pursue terrorism as a state policy with impunity, while all the blame is conveniently shifted onto a non-existent chimera. The ISI is made up of officers on deputation from the Pakistani military, it is no more "independent" than the Pakistani Military Engineering Service. To claim otherwise is just plain absurd.

As a final point, I feel it is high time the government revisited India’s approach in Afghanistan, and came up with a viable long-term strategy to secure her interests in the region independent of American designs and future actions. Until now, India’s strategy Afghanistan has been dependent on a significant US/NATO presence in the country, and her activities have been decidedly cautious, low-profile, and limited to providing aid and assistance with the country's rebuilding. While this may have been a plausible approach in the formative years of Afghanistan’s reconstruction, it makes little sense in the long-term, especially if India has to play a larger role in the region. This dependence has allowed Pakistan to play havoc with India’s plans, and also enabled the US to pressurise India to make compromises in Afghanistan. Ideally, this should not happen; if there is any geo-economic issue on which Indian and American interests align completely, at least for the foreseeable future, it is the question of who controls the Af-Pak region. However, it would be naïve for the Indian government to discount the United States propensity to sell its partners short for the sake of questionable short-term gains. A case in point is the suggestion in some circles in the US government that Pakistan’s concerns about Indian presence in Afghanistan are justified – implicit in which is the assumption that India’s activities in the region are far from benign, and that terrorism against NATO forces emanating from Pakistan would decline if India decreased her presence in the region. If the government of India wishes to truly secure Indian interests in the subcontinent, it will have to take positions and pursue lines of action that are not necessarily in line with America’s objectives in the region, and it will have to do so in the face of severe pressure from America and her allies. Further, it is important to understand that these actions and positions need not be held hostage to notions of righteousness or commitment to what was earlier said in public.

And finally, yes, I finally seem to have rid myself of that damned writer’s block, and hope to write more often!

Why the Right to Bear Arms Won't Help During a Terrorist Attack

In the aftermath on the November 26 terrorist attacks on Mumbai, there has been a growing tendency among some quarters to call for a relaxation of gun laws as a method of dealing with future attacks of this kind. These suggestions, howsoever well intentioned, are utterly misplaced. While it is easy for the layman to view the Taj incident as a simple firefight with two sides shooting at each other with the hope of getting a kill, in reality it is far more complicated.

While such opinion pieces wax eloquent on how guns serve only to “disarm peaceful and law-abiding people”, they always forget one important point. Using a firearm effectively requires marksmanship skills of a high order, and more importantly, firing discipline. When professional soldiers squeeze the trigger, they do so only when they are sure their target is an enemy combatant and not a civilian, and that too when they have a clear shot at their target. Moreover, the whole team works as a well-oiled machine so that their backs and flanks are not exposed to fire from other quarters (these terrorists are trained to occupy several strongpoints with overlapping fields of fire). And commandos train very hard for such situations, day in and day out to the point that they can practically read each others’ minds.

This is where the civilian falls short. I’m pretty sure that a majority of the people who buy firearms can barely hold them properly, leave alone shoot straight and exercise fire discipline. Imagine what would have happened if fifty such people had been in the Taj and Oberoi. The attackers did not go around with neon signs on their heads identifying them as terrorists; in civilian clothing, they looked pretty much like other civilians. And in the pandemonium at the Taj/Oberoi, a dangerous mixture of fear and adrenalin would have led to civilians with firearms shooting at each other as well as at unarmed civilians. Even if they had shot at the terrorists, there is a high likelihood that they would have missed and ended up killing more civilians.

That is not all. When the time to storm the building would have come, how would the NSG positively make the distinction between the attackers and civilians? After all, any person in civilian attire and a gun in his hand could have potentially been a terrorist. This would have caused needless and potentially fatal distractions, and led to the deaths of more civilians (both armed and unarmed) as well as commandos.

Therefore, the argument that gun control laws need to be relaxed so that the citizens can protect themselves is a non starter. A gun can be bought off the shelf, training and discipline cannot. And in the absence of the latter, the former is the proverbial “Bandar ke haath mein talwar” – instead of solving the problem, it only creates more chaos and leads to unnecessary loss of life.

R.I.P.

Megh, a friend of mine, posted this poem in the "Indian Army" community on orkut.

An Ode to Sam Manekshaw

On the first bough of IMA did he bloom,
Later to weave his name through history’s untiring loom.
A “Royal Scot” and the gem of “Frontier Force”,
Destiny pampered our Sam as Her favourite horse.
At Burma we almost lost him decades ago,
It did not please a bit his Benefactress though
And thus She ordained- “Let him live long
And spur the nations with his valour’s song”

Then he arose, with a halo newly gained
And fortunes of nations with élan he reigned.
For millions was he an angel of freedom
Moony Tyrants could never match his rhythm
And the History of a landmass had to alter
For how could Destiny let her darling falter!
The rulers hailed him and plebeians cheered
And there stood he who nothing had afeared.

To cite Padma Bhushan and Military Cross
Against this Destiny’s child is rather gross
For he rose above these honours mortal
And entered with pride the divine portal
Beyond which lies a life which ends never
And where for the likes of him are sung forever
The odes of Victory and joy and valour,
Immortalizing their endeavours stellar.

Today he lies still in the no-mans land
Where Life and Death on either sides stand.
May who claims him treats him befittingly
And let him see nothing but mirth and glee.
He has resided in our minds and hearts,
Lord, let not him endure Pain’s deadly darts.
If he has to depart, as per the pitiless divine law,
Let not his beautiful and mighty mind suffer any thaw


For here is our beloved-
Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw.

Shiv Aroor writes,

The man is made of the stuff they make football helmets from. Hard as nails. A real survivor. Over the last four years, he's been "critical" at least four times, and he's pick-axed his way back from the brink like the real fighter he is. Prayers.

A great soldier, a true patriot, and an inspiration to us all. The nation will be grateful to you forever.

Rest in peace, Sir!

Karan Thapar's Hatchet Job on Sam Bahadur

The sight of Indian mediawallahs going ga-ga over “flamboyant” and “dashing” Pakistani Generals is hardly anything new. But when Karan Thapar joined the bandwagon, it came as a bit of a surprise to me. Because Thapar is no fool, or so I used to believe. His interviews with politicians and other big wigs are at times, simply brilliant. So when he readily bought into Gohar Ayub Khan’s ludicrous allegations about Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw being a Pakistani spy, I smelled a rat. Calling Ayub an “officer and a gentleman”, and going weak in the knees at how “dashing” and “suave” he was, was certainly not what I expected from this “aggressive interviewer”. Was this the same Karan Thapar who had taken Arjun Singh and Renuka Chaudhary to the cleaners? If so, why were there no tough questions doubting Gohar’s credibility? After all, he is known for being corrupt to the core, and is regarded as something of a joke in his own country. Why was this one statement, “Why would a man lie to his own diary” the only proof Thapar needed to believe in what is an obvious attempt to sell a rag nobody would otherwise have given a second look? Why did he not notice how, if Pakistan lost in spite of having access to India’s war plans, Ayub was nothing but a blithering idiot? On the other hand, why was he baiting Field Marshal Manekshaw relentlessly? It almost seemed that he had a score to settle. This piece in “The Week” by R Prasanan cleared things up.

The troubling fact is that, though no one in India has ever accused Manekshaw of being a traitor, many have been jealous of his rise through the 1960s. The Army Headquarters in the 1960s was virtually divided into two groups, as has been brought out in the various accounts of the 1962 and 1965 operations. Nehru's defence minister Krishna Menon was grooming his own coterie, the most prominent among whom was B.M. Kaul whom he appointed commander of IV corps in the east. Menon also appointed the pliable Gen. P.N. Thapar to succeed K.S. Thimayya (whom Menon hated) as Army chief.

Thimayya's favourites-mainly Lt-Gen. S.P.P. Thorat, J.N. Choudhuri and Manekshaw-were sidelined during the Thapar-Kaul days. Thorat, who was a contender for the chief's post against Thapar, retired as a lieutenant-general. Thapar and Kaul also tried to block Manekshaw's promotion by instituting a frivolous inquiry against him.

The fortunes of Choudhuri and Manekshaw looked up after the Thapar-Kaul duo goofed up the 1962 war. Thapar resigned forthwith, and was succeeded as chief by Choudhuri. Thapar later managed an ambassadorship in Afghanistan. It is said, Thapar's Kabul appointment papers were the last papers signed by Nehru. Kaul had to quit in disgrace; he was succeeded by Manekshaw as IV corps commander.

So there we have it! Thapar does have a bone to pick with Field Marshal Manekshaw! He makes it a point to mention that he is a general’s son. What he conveniently leaves out, is the fact that he is the son of an officer who was popular with the likes of V.K. Krishna Menon for obvious reasons. An officer whose incompetence probably lost India the 1962 war against China. An officer who had tried to create hurdles in the way of Manekshaw’s promotion. As Prasanan rightly points out, “Thapar has the distinction of being the only Army chief who had to quit in disgrace. And Manekshaw has the distinction of having been the most successful chief ever.”

Karan Thapar fails to see the irony in the words he uses to describe Ayub Khan – “As a general’s son I can tell you they don’t make them like this any more!” Good thing too, Mr. Thapar! If they don’t make them like your father anymore, India is surely in good hands!

Interviews with Admiral Arun Prakash

Shiv Aroor has published a series of insightful interviews with Admiral Arun Prakash, who he rightly refers to as “one of the most articulate and admired military chiefs of our time” on his blog:

Admiral Arun Prakash on the China Threat:

“Our dilemma vis-à-vis China is two-fold. On the one hand, we need to moderate the school of thought within the political establishment (encouraged no doubt by exhortations from the Left), which focuses exclusively on China's declarations about her “peaceful rise”. Indulging in a great deal of naive self-delusion, this school points to the ongoing dialogue and the dramatic increase in bilateral Sino-Indian trade, which is pushing the US$20 billion mark, as proof of China's good intentions.

On the other hand, our strategic establishment has to make a hard headed assessment and find answers to three straight questions before we decide on the future course of Sino-Indian relations: What is the rationale behind China's "string of pearls" strategy through which she has assiduously and neatly encircled India with states which are either her clients or beholden to her for economic and weapons related assistance?”

Admiral Arun Prakash On The New Indo-US Strategic Partnership:

“In international relations you cannot go wrong if you proceed on the basis of two premises: It is not altruism but self-interest that invariably motivates nations. There are no free lunches, and a price will one day have to be paid for everything. And, when you negotiate in the big league, you should be prepared to play hard ball.”

Admiral Arun Prakash on What Platforms The Future Indian Navy Needs:

“Navies have, for centuries, been accepted and used as instruments of diplomacy and state policy. Therefore, unlike the other Services, they derive their raison d’etre not merely from a nation’s maritime security, but from its larger economic interests and geo-political aspirations.”

Admiral Arun Prakash on DRDO, Obsolesence and Self-Reliance:

“We were fortunate that the seeds of a self-reliant blue water Navy were sown by our farsighted predecessors when they embarked on the brave venture of undertaking warship construction in India four decades ago. Since then, our shipyards have done very well to have delivered more than 85 ships and submarines, many of Indian design, to the IN.”

Admiral Arun Prakash on the Need For Nuclear Submarines:

“I must convey with all the emphasis at my command that in India’s case nuclear weapons are NOT meant for war-fighting. In fact they must not even be thought of as “weapons”, but as “political instruments” of state policy to be used to deter an enemy from contemplating a nuclear attack, and if required for persuasion, coercion, or compellence.”

For the full interviews, head over to LiveFist - this material is solid gold.

Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder – An Analysis

On March 23 2007, two JF-17 “Thunder” fighters took to the skies for the first time in Pakistan as a part of the Pakistan Day celebrations. Touted to be Pakistan's first home made fighter, the JF-17 is expected to be the Pakistan Air Force's frontline fighter well into the future. With this article, I’ve made an attempt to examine the JF-17 in the Indo-Pak context. But first, some background information on the program.

The program began in 1986 as the Super-7, when China signed a $550 million deal with Grumman to modernise its fleet of J-7 (MiG-21s manufactured in China under license) fighters. The United States ceased technical assistance following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, and the project almost ground to a halt. However, Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC) managed to keep the program alive with its own resources, as the FC-1. The project got a new lease of life in 1999, when Pakistan and China signed an agreement to “jointly” develop and produce the FC-1 with both countries contributing 50% of the funds. Russia’s Mikoyan Aero-Science Production Group provided technical assistance. The FC-1 (Designated JF-17 “Thunder” by Pakistan) was supposed to be a lightweight all-weather multi-role fighter, which would replace Pakistan’s fleet of Mirage-III, F-7, and A-5 aircraft, whose safety record is going downhill by the day. The Pakistani version would sport a Western avionics suite, which included the Italian Galileo Avionica Grifo S7 radar, a variant of which is already in service with the Pakistan Air Force on its F-7 fighters. It would be powered by one Russian Klimov RD-93 turbofan. The “Aviation Week & Space Technology” magazine reported in November 2006 that “Pakistani officials expect the first contract for 16 aircraft (split equally with China) to be awarded next year, with deliveries as early as 2007. A full-rate production contract would follow around 2009. Initially, Pakistan will provide 58% of the parts, but that is supposed to increase gradually to 100%.” The overall Pakistani requirement is expected to be around 150 fighters.

Although the Pakistanis tried to demonstrate with the Pakistan Day flypast that everything was tickety-boo, this is far from the truth. The Western avionics are nowhere to be seen, and supplier decisions do not appear to have been made. Radar integration, a challenging job under the best of circumstances, seems to have run into problems. The task is complicated in no small part by the lack of space available in the JF-17’s radome. It is now widely claimed that the first batch of Pakistani JF-17s will be equipped with Chinese avionics and radar. The weapons package is yet to be finalised. While China is expected to push its PL-9 dogfight missile and the yet untested SD-10 beyond visual range air to air missile, the South Africans have reportedly offered their A-Darter and T-Darter missiles. In January 2007, the head of the Russian Defence Ministry's International Cooperation Department, Colonel-General Anatoly Mazurkevich, announced that Russia had “denied China the right to supply its JF-17 fighter aircraft powered by Russian RD-93 engines to third countries, asking it to sign an end-user certificate for the engines”. In Indian circles, this was taken to be a total Russian denial. Sinodefence.com, a Chinese military website reports that while five RD-93s have been purchased to power the prototypes, an agreement on the further purchase and re-export of the engine is still pending. To make things worse, the Chinese have yet to make any firm commitments, and appear to have lost interest in inducting the FC-1, preferring the more capable J-10 instead.

Given development time-frame and mission profile, comparisons between the JF-17 and India’s “Tejas” light combat aircraft are inevitable. But similarities, if any, are merely superficial. The Tejas, meant to replace India’s massive fleet of MiG-21s, is a wholly different project as far as technology is concerned. Its airframe, made of advanced carbon fibre composites, is light years ahead of the Thunder’s all-metal airframe. The ADA, HAL, and NAL invested considerable time, effort, and resources in its development, and came up with what is arguably one of the finest airframes in the world. The same goes for the Tejas’ aerodynamics which, because of the compound delta-wing, extensive wing-body blending, and low wing loading are superior to those of the Thunder, which has a more conventional layout along the lines of the MiG-21, the F-16, and a rejected Soviet light fighter design. As far as flight dynamics and control go, the Tejas, with its relaxed static stability and quadruplex, full authority fly-by-wire digital flight control system, is far more advanced than the Thunder, which still features conventional controls (fly-by-wire exists only for pitch control). The Tejas then, is a state of the art combat aircraft which will be India’s first step towards self-reliance. Program wise, it is more comparable to the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale, considering not just the technology involved, but also the scope of the project. In the light of this argument, its longer timeline is hardly surprising. But the Thunder, despite Pakistan’s best efforts to package it as “indigenous”, is anything but. Pakistan’s contribution to the design and development of the project is close to nothing. Even today, the plane does not sport any Pakistani systems. It is at best a cheap and low/medium-tech Chinese aircraft that Pakistan can mass produce. As Siva, a contributor on Bharat Rakshak points out, the JF-17 is more comparable to the HJT-36 Sitara intermediate jet trainer – since both have an all-metal airframe, conventional controls, and an externally sourced engine. And the Sitara was developed even faster than the Thunder.

This is not to say that the JF-17 is a bad aircraft. It will serve a very important purpose by giving Pakistan valuable experience in fighter aircraft manufacturing. It will help Pakistan rid itself of dependence on American weapons. It will give the flagging Pakistan Air Force a shot in the arm by beefing up numbers and providing it with decent beyond visual range combat capability. Dismissing it as “worthless” would be nothing short of stupid. My friend and aviation enthusiast Kartik sums it up beautifully: “If the Pakistanis integrate even a medium performance radar and use the SD-10 with it, it is a big threat to the Indian Air Force – just look at the MiG-21 Bison to see what an underestimated fighter can turn out to be. The Sukhoi Su-30K was also found to be a poor aircraft when the IAF first evaluated it, and then after all sweat and toil put into getting its avionics in place and the thrust vector controls, the Su-30MKI is a completely different beast! I somehow fear that the JF-17 shouldn’t prove to be a fighter that makes the Fulcrums, Mirages, Bisons almost on-par or just a little superior. Which is why the IAF needs a true fourth generation fighter to stay ahead – both airframe wise as well as avionics wise.”

Shiv Aroor has also posted this article on his blog.

Enter the Republican Guard

The pictures of the 10^th Parachute Regiment jogging down Rajpath while chanting some slogan on Republic Day left me stunned. Till date, such hoo-haa drills were the sole preserve of the Pakistanis and other Middle Eastern riff-raff. Why, oh why, have we decided to emulate the cartoon-like antics of the crappiest of chest-thumping Armies? Armies that have an impeccable combat record only against innocent women and children? Armies that have been taken to the cleaners time and again by real soldiers?

The Indian armed forces always always spoke softly and carried a big stick. It was in keeping with this trend that the ridiculous goose-stepping at Wagah was done away with. So what in God’s good name were the concerned authorities trying to achieve with this jumping-jack tamasha?

2006: The Year Russia Schooled The West

I found the following article on “The eXile”, which is a Moscow based... uhh... "newspaper" (for want of a better word). The views expressed do not necessarily coincide with my own. But the staff at The eXile has done a helluva job! A must read, this article is!

This past year was a watershed both for Russia and for Russia's detractors alike. As they used to say after 9/11, "everything's changed." Although not exactly how the West imagined it.

For the first time since Mikhail Gorbachev launched his doomed Perestroika reforms, Russia returned to its rightful place as the White World's Bogeyman, annoying the living shit out of every self-righteous, sexually-frustrated Western missionary with its mixture of menace and mo'. Playing up its new role as something like a cross between Bugs Bunny, the Tasmanian Devil, and P Diddy, Russia is now officially "confident," the biggest sin a country could possibly commit if said country attained its confidence while mooning the West.

In this end-of-the-year issue of The eXile, we look back at 2006: The Year Russia Schooled The West. And looking back at each major event as if it was a university course, we issue Russia its bestest, and most-annoyingest, report card ever.

Below is Russia's report card in each subject in which it competed with The West. We at the eXile hope that by reprinting this report card in an open and transparent manner, that the lessons learned will assist all of us in the New Year.

Read further...

The "Failure" That is DRDO

It’s official. The DRDO is a DODO. The Arjun tank is a no-show. The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft still is nowhere near completion in spite of being in development since 1983. The Prithvi missile is already obsolete. The Agni-III fell into the sea during its very first test. The air-force wouldn’t touch the Akash with a ten foot pole. India would certainly be better off without the DRDO, which has done nothing except consume ridiculous amounts of money with no positive output. At least this is what the Indian English-language media would have you believe. I am, of course, referring to the Indian Express’ eight-part exposé on the DRDO, which is one of the most stunning examples of journalistic crap I’ve seen coming from the Indian media in a long time. As if obfuscation and baseless comparisons weren’t enough, the Express has resorted to printing outright lies under the garb of investigative journalism. Because of lack of time and space, I’ve trashed only three of these articles in this post.

1) 6,000 cr wasted, 10-yr delay & they want 150,000 cr more

Quite unsurprisingly, the first article of the series is the standard anti-DRDO rant. It seems to me that the Indian Express has a bone to pick with the DRDO. They have apparently missed the plethora of projects that the DRDO has successfully delivered. The Agni Missiles, the Akash SAM's 3D Central Acquisition Radar, the Rajendra Radar (shown right), the Battlefield Surveillance Radar, the MiG-27 and Jaguar upgrades and the Samyukta and Sangraha Electronic Warfare systems are just a few examples of the DRDO's successful endeavours. This article only focuses on the negative aspects of the LCA and the Arjun.

Moeover, the way Amitav Ranjan and Shiv Aroor have compared the DRDO to its Chinese counterparts just goes to show how little they know about defence research in India. It is not the DRDO’s fault that the government doesn’t pour millions of dollars into defence research, as the Chinese do. It is not the DRDO’s fault that the Air Force and Army want world-class products that are also inexpensive and able to keep up with their whimsical requirements.

2) Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark

Ranjan and Aroor claim that “former deputy director of the Prithvi project and now DRDO’s chief controller of missiles and strategic systems Dr. V. K. Saraswat’s report RCI/PGT/PGM/1 admits: “Accuracy of missiles like Prithvi is acceptable in surface-to-surface theatre role, but precision strike without collateral damage is not possible with this system.”” I simply cannot bring myself to believe that someone of Dr. Saraswat’s stature could make such a childish statement. Ballistic missiles aren’t designed for precision strike. Their precision is measured in terms of the Circular Error Probable (CEP), which is defined as the radius of a circle into which a missile will land at least half the time. And the CEP of the Prithvi-I (10-75 metres) and Prithvi-II are comparable to similar missiles. The job of precision strike is better left to the precision guided munitions fielded by the Air Force and cruise missiles.

Also notice the way they imply that the Agni-III is a failure, because it “plunged into the sea after just five minutes of flight in July”. What they don’t mention is that such high-tech missiles do fail on their first test flights, as the American MX-774, or Russia’s latest Bulava SLBM did. That is certainly not a reason to just give up on their development, because, last I knew, no country was ready to violate the Missile Technology Control Regime to provide India with a long-range ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Another ridiculous claim by the two journalists is about how “an exasperated IAF, which calls Phase-I user trials (of the Akash SAM) unsatisfactory, has decided to buy Israeli Spyder missile systems instead”. This, when it is known that the short-ranged Spyder is supposed to make up for the lack of the Trishul.

But this one takes the cake: “Saraswat’s report calls for integrating Nag’s seeker with Prithvi to make the latter a precision-guided munition (PGM) but that hasn’t worked either”. Anyone with basic knowledge of missile guidance would know that simply bolting an IIR seeker of an anti-tank missile onto a hulking big ballistic missile which flies many times faster and wishing it would turn it into a fantabulously cool PGM is nothing short of stupid.

3) Arjun, Main Battle Tanked

This article is a perfect example of how, through selective reporting and obfuscation, one can trash a perfectly fine product, and make it look inferior to what can be bought in the Chor Bazaar for half the price. The two “journalists”, while glibly proclaiming how “the T-90, a far superior tank, can kill the Arjun” don’t elaborate on exactly how they arrived at this conclusion. I suppose they have access to the results of Arjun v/s T-90 tests in different scenarios, because, as a professional journalist, I would have balked at making such apparently baseless statements without solid proof. But then again, this is the Indian media we are talking about. They claim that the Arjun weighs much more than the T-90 without attempting to explain where all the extra weight comes from. My logic tells me that the Arjun has heavier and superior armour. So do many reputed publications. Maybe the American M1A1, the German Leopard-II, and the British Challenger-II are horrible tanks too. In fact, they are even heavier than the Arjun! But the Pakistani Al-Khalid, being the lighter tank, is obviously superior! Going by that logic, the answer to our troubles lies in (hold your breath) the venerable Maruti-800! It has everything the DDM claims the Arjun lacks. It is cheap, mobile, light, air-conditioned, and nimbler than the vaunted T-90. Plus, with our present railway infrastructure we can easily carry it to border areas. Sure, the Arjun trounces the Maruti-800 (and the T-90) when it comes to sheer firepower, armour, crew protection, crew comfort, and electronics. But since when have these things been important?

The Express also makes a big fuss about how the temperature inside the Arjun reaches an “abnormal” 55 degrees. But it fails to mention the reason why this happens. After all, the DRDO had offered an air-conditioned Arjun to the Army, but the latter rejected the idea. So, is the temperature problem the fault of the Army or the DRDO? And the T-90 has faced problems with high interior temperatures too - its thermal imagers packed up in the blistering heat of the Thar. It was unable to fire the Reflecks missile until quite recently. The engine had its own problems. So why was it accepted with such alacrity? Why was it not subject to rigorous testing the way the Arjun was? Why was the Arjun supposed to be a tank that was heavily armoured, comfortable, fast, small, light, and cheap at the same time? Why was it subjected to continuously changing goalposts? Why does everyone seem to suffer from memory loss when one mentions how the initial requirements, which called for a relatively simple 40-ton tank to replace the Vijayanta, were changed when Pakistan decided to acquire the formidable M1A1 Abrams? Maybe Ranjan and Aroor, in their infinite wisdom, would like to tell us how the DRDO (or anyone else for that matter) can design such a tank in a short span of time.

Generally speaking, the writers seem to have spent all their time coming up with creative titles for each part of the series, rather than doing what they are paid to do – report the facts as they are. Adding insult to injury is the fact the Indian Express has spoken of DRDO's apparently non-existent accountablity, while they themselves are accountable to no one. The DRDO will not sue them for libel. The goverment will make a few noises about how things have to be improved. The educated public, which knows squat about defence, will feel proud of our “free” and “empowered” media, which in reality, thrives on lies, half-truths, and sensationalism. All of which reminds me of the Michael Jackson number, “Tabloid Junkie”

It’s slander
You say it's not a sword
But with your pen you torture men
You'd crucify the Lord

Recommended reading material on the DRDO:

• The DRDO Webpage
• DRDO on Wikipedia - This page contains a list of most (if not all) successful DRDO projects.
• India developing new missiles Towards destroying hostile missiles
• An excellent three part series on the DRDO by rediff
• The Army and the Arjun Experiment - Lt. Gen Niranjan Malik, PVSM (Retd.)
  

Book Review: The Writing on the Wall - India Checkmates America 2017

I'm currently reading "The Writing on the Wall - India Checkmates America 2017" by General Padmanabhan (Retd). It would be an understatement to call this book a disappointment. The grammar couldn't be worse, tenses are all wrong in half the paragraphs, spelling mistakes make their presence felt from time to time, there are too many "Given the right chance, Indians are second to none" cliches, and conversations (even the informal ones) between the characters are too dry and full of diplomat-ese to make them seem believable. Some parts of this book come across as political essays rather than chapters of a novel, and completely mess up the flow of the story. As if all this were not bad enough, the portrayal of politicians as resolute patriots who put the country before the party, the absence of inter-departmental rivalries, the development of a super-duper missile-defence shield by India which defends the country against a salvo of Tomahawk missiles launched by the USA, and the way in which things just fall into place for India make this book as believable as one of Karan Johar's movies. The shrill anti-American rhetoric only serves to make things worse.

But then again, there are some parts of the book that are so insightful and well-crafted, that they could only be penned by the hands of a seasoned soldier like General Padmanabhan. He illustrates very well what a determined India with a resolute and focused leadership and workforce is capable of achieving. His description of a "National Agenda" and a "National Defence Plan", research under military science & technology establishments free of corruption and bureaucratic hassles, the handling of internal unrest which results in peace in Nagaland, Manipur and Assam, and the Indian retaliation against Pakistani attacks hold many lessons for the country. But these scenarios are few and far in between, and given the current state of our politics, hardly realistic.

All in all, this is the kind of book one would expect Tarun Tejpal (of Bunker 13 "fame") to write. Coming from an ex Army Chief, and a very good Chief, I must say, this book is a huge let-down.